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Introduction 44
In 2008 the UK Organ Donor Taskforce (ODT) introduced a series of recommendations designed to 45 increase the UK's historically low rates of organ donation and tackle its large waiting lists for 46 transplantation. Among the recommendations was the requirement to urgently resolve the 47 "outstanding legal, ethical and professional issues" around controlled organ donation after circulatory 48 death (DCD) in order to "ensure that all clinicians are supported and are able to work within a clear 49 framework of good practice" (Department of Health, 2008: 9). At this time, there was no clear legal 50 position or standardised protocols for DCD in the UK, and the practice was rare (Gardiner, 2016) . 51
Controlled DCD involves retrieving organs from donors who are declared dead on the basis of cardio-52 respiratory criteria. Whilst DCD was used in early experiments of transplant medicine in the 1950s and 53 60s, it became largely obsolete after the establishment of brain death in the 1970s, enabling the 54 recovery of oxygenated organs from brain dead donors (De Vita, Snyder & Grenvik, 1993). However, 55 declines in rates of brain death over the last two decades have led to the focus on reviving DCD as a 56 way of expanding the availability of transplantable organs (Academy of Medical Royal Colleges & UK 57 Donation Ethics Committee, 2011). Since the 2008 recommendations, the UK's DCD programme has 58 rapidly expanded, with DCD donors now constituting 41% of all deceased donors in the UK (NHS Blood  59 and Transplant, 2017) . 60
Yet, despite its ability to increase rates of donor organs, DCD has long been the subject of ethical 61 controversy, since it necessitates intervening in the care of dying patients in order to obtain quality 62 organs for transplantation (e.g. Bell, 2003; Fox, 1993) . The resurgence of DCD has subsequently led to 63 debates in the clinical and bioethics literature regarding the tension between the drive to optimise 64 the potential for organ donation and the role of medicine at the end-of-life (Bell, 2008; Gardiner & 65 Riley, 2007; Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010) . In response to these concerns, and following the ODT's 66 recommendations, the policy response to DCD has rapidly developed, with the production of new 67 clinical, legal, and ethical guidelines. These policies attempt to clarify ambiguities relating to DCD and 68 4 | P a g e act as guides to best practice for health professionals, for example, by outlining how to assess the 69 'overall benefit' of organ donation for a dying patient (e.g. Academy of Medical Royal Colleges & UK 70 Donation Ethics Committee, 2011; British Transplant Society, 2013; Department of Health, 2009). The 71 generation of these policies has led the National Deputy Clinical Lead for Organ Donation to claim that 72 the UK has 'overcome' the ethical challenges involved in DCD, positioning the nation as a 'world-73 leader' in the practice (Gardiner, 2016) . 74
75
The official discourse around the ethics of DCD therefore gives the impression that the problem of 76 DCD has been defined, and, in turn, has been resolved through the provision of abstract directives for 77 the (ethical) practice of DCD. In contrast, in this paper, I draw on Michael Lynch's (2001 Lynch's ( , 2013 call to 78 respecify ethics in order to show how ethics in DCD are not simply universal moral issues, but become 79 locally composed within specific circumstances, at particular times. Lynch's respecification draws on 80 the tradition of ethnomethodology, which seeks to examine how taken-for-granted issues, concepts 81 and topics, like ethics, can be understood "in-and-as-of-the-workings-of-ordinary-society" (Button, 82 1991: 6) and are made "locally and practically relevant" (Lynch, 1993: xii) . In taking this approach I will 83
show that ethics in DCD can be understood as practical sets of problems, which get constructed and 84 resolved within specific healthcare settings. In so doing, this paper engages with social science work 85 which contextually situates ethical issues in science and medicine (e.g. Brodwin, 2008; Hoeyer & 86 Jensen, 2012; Smith-Doerr & Vardi, 2015) , by highlighting how ethics are assembled as a practical-87 organisational problem. It also advances an alternative perspective to the clinical and bioethical 88 debates around DCD, by arguing that we cannot fully understand the ethical conundrum of DCD 89 without examining the organisational milieu within which DCD is constructed as a potential concern, 90 and is made to happen in practice. 91
92
To do this, I utilise data from an ethnographic study on the institutional production of the 'minority 93 ethnic organ donor' in the context of UK organ donation practices (Cooper, 2016; Kierans & Cooper, 94 5 | P a g e 2011, 2013). The research was conducted between 2009 and 2011 when UK organ donation services 95 were undergoing infrastructural change following the ODT's recommendations. Drawing on exemplars 96 from a case hospital, which was in the process of developing its own DCD programme during the 97 period of fieldwork, I describe the particular institutional circumstances in which DCD was both 98 produced as a potential problem for the hospital and was made practicably workable. Before turning 99 to the data, I further specify the bioethical and clinical debates around DCD. I then outline the social 100 science literatures which have dealt with diverse controversies in transplant medicine, before 101 highlighting bodies of research in the social sciences which take a situated approach to understanding 102 ethics in science and medicine -an understanding to which this paper contributes. 103
104

DCD and its controversies: situating (ethical) concerns in organ transplantation 105
As previously commented (Cooper, 2017) , the debates around DCD are not uniquely located within 106 the UK. Arguments over the dilemmas involved in DCD were ignited in 1992 with the introduction in 107
the US of what became known as the 'Pittsburgh Protocol for non-heartbeating organ donation', 108 which advocated aggressive organ preservation techniques and the removal of organs two minutes 109 after the donor's heart stopped. This prompted debate between clinicians and bioethicists about 110 potential violations of the dead donor rule, given the short time permitted between asystole and the 111 declaration of death (Arnold & Youngner, 1993) . Commenting on the protocol, the anthropologist 112 Renee Fox (1993: 231) went so far as to label DCD an "ignoble form of cannibalism", referring to the 113 "morally questionable" practices it permitted. 114
In the UK context, death is legally declared in DCD donors 5 minutes after cardio-respiratory arrest, 115 facilitate DCD when it is understood that the dying patient would have wanted donation and that 131 further life-sustaining treatment is not of overall benefit (AoMRC/UK DEC, 2011; BTS, 2013). The 132 policies therefore focus on standardising the ethical-legal frameworks around DCD, as a way of 133 enabling the renewal of this controversial technology (Bernat, 2008; Cooper, 2017) . 134
However, the prevailing representation of DCD as a bioethical concern which can be mitigated by the 135 production and implementation of clinical guidelines, means that little is known about how the ethics 136 of DCD are instantiated within everyday healthcare settings. That there is a gap in this area is 137 surprising, given the attention which has been paid to the field of organ transplantation and its 138 associated controversies by social scientists. This work, writ large, has been concerned with issues 139 regarding how and when organ donation occurs, and how and by whom organs are obtained. It 140 includes studies of: the controversy over the re-definition of death, with the introduction of brain 141 death in the 1960s and 70s (Giacomini, 1997; Lock, 2002a) ; ambiguities around the boundaries 142 between life and death in the context of the still-breathing brain dead organ donor (Hogle, 1999; The focus by Das on the tensions between normative bioethical principles and the everyday lives of 160 those upon whom these categories are supposed to act, reflects early calls by social scientists to 161 broaden bioethics beyond the domain of moral philosophy into understandings of the "social 162 processes of moral life" (Fox, 1976; Hoffmaster, 1992; Kleinman, 1999: 72) . Writing in this journal 163 more than two decades ago, Hoffmaster (1992: 1462) called for examination of the social and practical are such issues discussed and resolved in these settings? It is these questions which this paper is 180 concerned with addressing, in order to develop a more situated understanding of the ethics of DCD. 181
Below, I outline the methodology for the broader study from which the data is taken, before turning 182 to the findings. 183
Methodology 184
The data in this paper is drawn from an ethnographic study which aimed to examine the institutional 185 production of the 'minority ethnic organ donor' in the UK, from the perspective of organ donation and 186 allocation practices (Cooper, 2016; Kierans & Cooper, 2011 . The study was developed in 187 response to the characterisation, by transplant medicine, of UK Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 188 populations as a problematic constituency of organ givers, due to their high demand for transplantable 189 organs and low rates of organ donation, in comparison to their 'white' counterparts (Kierans & Cooper, 190 2011) . In contrast to the emphasis by health researchers on the cultural beliefs of BME groups around 191 organ donation, the project focused on the healthcare settings and institutional processes through 192 which potential (BME) donors are managed, and organ donation is requested. This approach to the 193 9 | P a g e problem was informed by work across sociology, anthropology and science and technology studies, 194 concerned with the contexts and intricacies of scientific and medical practice (e.g. Hogle, 1999; 195 Timmermans & Berg, 2003) . opportunity by Hillview to increase its low rates of organ donors. As a result, much of the fieldwork at 219
Hillview eventually focused on the introduction of the DCD programme into the Trust. The research 220 data (fieldnotes and interview transcripts) was analysed iteratively during the course of the study. The 221 analytical approach was broadly thematic, looking for commonalities in meaning-making and practices 222 around organ donation, alongside situating these issues within wider institutional, social and political 223 contexts, such as the national drive to increase organ donation. Narrative interviews were also 224 subjected to a structured narrative analysis, to understand how participants constructed their 225 experiences of managing and requesting organ donation (Reissman, 2008) . 226
In what follows, I first outline how concerns around DCD were constructed as sets of practical issues, 227 specific to the organisational setting of Hillview. In turn, I describe how these problems were worked 228 around by creating the conditions to make DCD practically possible for the Trust, and through the 229 animation of new DCD procedures into acceptable forms of practice for the local setting. It is 230 important to note that, while the project was focused on understanding organ donation in relation to 231 ethnicity, the broad ethnographic lens meant that data captured general institutional practices and 232 processes around organ donation to contextualise the issue (see also Kierans & Cooper, 2013) . This were being overly-aggressive in their drive to increase donor rates, and that attempts to clarify 273 the legal aspects of DCD were not as straightforward as they may seem, explaining that "it's 274 (DCD) not like boiling an egg: you don't know what's in the patient's best interests". Emily also 275 divulged an incident which had occurred some years previously, when an inexperienced 276
Intensive Care clinician had tried to, in her words, "push through" a non-heart beating donation 277 (as DCD was then called) without there being any policies at Hillview for this process. According 278 to Emily, a number of staff were unhappy with the occurrence: it had, as she put it, "left a bad 279 taste in peoples' mouths": a wariness about the new drive to implement DCD at Hillview. 280
Here we see the ways in which broader concerns around DCD -such as ethical issues involved 281 in judging the best interest of a patient, and worries about litigation -interact with the local 282 specificities of Hillview, as a Trust which was viewed to hold particular problems for the roll-out 283 of a DCD programme. These issues included: the lack of an existing culture around donation at 284 Hillview, with an ICU team little-used to managing the process of organ donation; understanding 285 donation as being more difficult in relation to the particular locale of Hillview, with a South Asian 286 patient population conceived of as particularly problematic for organ donation; and fears about 287 the reality of conducting DCD, underpinned by past experiences at the Trust. Whereas national 288 guidelines highlight abstract ethical and legal aspects of DCD, in relation to assessing the overall 289 interest of the patient during decisions around end-of-life care and organ donation, in the 290 context of Hillview, DCD became an emerging matter of concern specific to the locale within 291 which it was being implemented: in the connection to existing and historical practices, and 292 patient populations. Ethics, in this context, therefore became constructed and encountered as 293 a practical set of problems within the organisational setting of Hillview. 294 However, as I show below, the particular problems encapsulated by Hillview for the roll-out of 295 DCD were also, conversely, viewed as an opportunity for the Trust. 296 DCD as opportunity: practically accomplishing DCD at Hillview 297 13 | P a g e As part of its attempts to overhaul the hospital's previously poor record on organ donation, 298
Hillview went public in its campaign to drive up its donor rates. Press releases from the hospital 299 and local media pieces reported on the new initiative to increase organ donation in the area, 300 focusing, in particular, on the need to promote donation to the local South Asian community. 301
These reports highlighted the potential for the initiative to save lives in the region, describing 302 how the increased number of donors at Hillview since the changes were rolled out had helped 303 save the lives of a number of people waiting for transplant. What was left out of the reports, 304 however, were the exact details of what this 'initiative' involved: with DCD being a key aspect 305 of Hillview's plan to overhaul its organ donation services. 306
During the course of delivering a training session presentation to ICU nurses about the roll-out 307 of DCD, Emily highlighted to her audience the fact that there were over 100 people waiting for 308 a kidney transplant at Hillview, and that nearly 10 people had died while waiting for a kidney in 309
the previous year. Emily emphasised the potential for DCD to assist in the reduction of these 310 waiting lists to her audience. This, she told them, is due to the fact that kidneys from DCD donors 311 are usually offered to local transplant centres, because of the shortened time in which kidneys 312 can be left outside the body in DCD. While problems in DCD were locally composed, they were 313 also drawn on as reason for introducing DCD at Hillview. The implementation of DCD was 314 promoted as an organisational opportunity for Hillview: it would work in the hospital's favour 315 by providing the potential to reduce its own transplant waiting lists. Rather than simply being 316 presented as a broader part of the realisation of the ODT's national recommendations, the 317 implementation of DCD was thus represented as way of tackling local problems at Hillview. 318
A crucial aspect to making the plans for DCD a reality at Hillview was through the coordination 319 of different people and resources at the hospital. For Emily and John, a large part of this work 320 involved bringing together and negotiating the interests of different actors who would be 321 involved in DCD. John explained to me the challenge of this process: 322
Initially it took right until the beginning of this year to convince the 6 main Intensive 323 Care consultants to agree to set up this programme, and the feeling was we couldn't 324 really set it up without everybody's agreement. So having got the agreement of the 6 325 14 | P a g e main Intensivists, we then had to seek support from the rest of the team: all the 326 nursing staff, both here and theatres, and the Emergency department, and the 327 consultants in the Emergency department. And we've talked to an awful lot of people 328 in the last six months, and we got to the point where we'd got a fairly good pathway 329 defined and we're having to […]make sure that we're all happy in how it's set out. 330
John describes the work involved to make DCD a practical possibility. This involved, in the first 331 instance, lengthy negotiations to secure the agreement of various staff members, including: Intensive 332
Care consultants, nursing staff, Emergency Department consultants, and theatre staff. During this 333 negotiation process, localised concerns about DCD were worked around and re-constructed through 334 the initiation and alignment of various people at the Trust, who were crucial for the establishment of 335 the DCD programme. In so doing, the spaces needed to perform DCD (the Emergency Department, 336 ICU wards, and operating theatres) were also made available. The production of the DCD programme 337 was therefore not simply a matter of overcoming ethical concerns about the practice itself. In order 338 to begin to consider the ethical issues involved in DCD, John and Emily had to first create the conditions 339 to ensure that DCD was a practical possibility, by co-opting diverse bodies of staff and resources into 340 going forward with the process. 341
With the support of the ICU, Emergency and Theatre departments at the Hospital, Emily and John 342 could begin to roll-out the DCD programme. A key element to achieving this was in the generation and 343 dissemination of a local protocol for DCD, to provide practical certainty to the process (Hogle, 2009 ). 344
One year after Emily started working at Hillview, the DCD programme was pre-launched with training 345 sessions for ICU and Emergency Department staff to introduce them to the new procedures for 346 conducting DCD at the Trust. These sessions took place during lunch-time slots in Emily's office, which 347 also doubled-up as the ICU's seminar room. During one such session with some of the ICU nurses, 348
Emily took her audience through the Trusts DCD protocol on PowerPoint slides. 349
Emily was concerned with emphasising the importance for her audience of developing ownership over 350 the new procedures around DCD, so that they were able to respond to events as they unfolded in 351 practice. She talked the nurses through each stage of DCD, encouraging their feedback at each step. 352
She asked her audience whether they thought a dying patient should be maintained with therapies if 353 15 | P a g e they had not yet obtained their relative's agreement for donation. One nurse replied with "I wouldn't"; 354
Emily assured her audience of the flexibility of this procedure, by telling them that such decisions 355 should be made as events play out on the day. One slide, highlighted in bold stated that "consent can 356 be revoked at any time", referring to the fact that families can withdraw their consent for donation 357 right up until the first incision is made in theatre. At this point, the nurses interjected with their 358 concerns about family members chasing their dead relative through the hospital corridor. One nurse 359 expressed her more general worry that families would feel under pressure to consent to donate when 360 their relative is not yet even dead. Emily interjects: "I know what you're thinking, that's what I thought 361 before I did it for the first time, but it's not like that at all." A discussion then ensued about the 362 potential problems involved in transporting someone who is obviously dead to the operating theatre 363 and how this might look to members of the public. Emily discussed likely tactics: "We'll have someone 364 waiting by the lift and to clear the corridors. We may even cover their face with an oxygen mask for 365 sanity reasons, so that you don't get people stopping you asking what you're doing with that patient". 366
The introduction of the new DCD programme in training sessions provoked debate and, at times, 367 criticism from ICU staff regarding possible issues it could raise for potential donor families. At the end 368 of a training session, one nurse became quite opinionated and, arms folded, expressed her worries 369 about the implications of a family member giving consent for DCD if they were not aware of their 370 relative's wishes around donation. Emily reassured her, firmly asserting that she would advise a family 371 member against going ahead with donation if they were not comfortable with the idea of it. 372
Dissatisfied with this answer, the nurse pressed: "I just don't agree with it (DCD), it sounds like you're 373 pushing it on a family. I've got a donor card but you get some families who are so distressed, and then 374 to have a team approaching them about donation is wrong". In response, Emily calmly told her that 375 everyone was entitled to their opinion and that it was important to talk about issues like the one the 376 nurse raised. In a later interview with Emily, I questioned her over this incident. Emily recalled how, 377 after the session, this particular nurse had approached her with an apology: "she said: 'I'm really sorry 378 for behaving like that in there (…) I'm really pro-donation'. I think it's difficult when you have your own 379 views and then you see patients and families isn't it? It's just that very fine line". Here, Emily refers to 380 the tension between health professionals being pro-DCD in theory, but the struggles some may 381 experience with carrying this stance into practice, when faced with dying patients and distressed 382 families. 383
It was in these training sessions, therefore, that the local concerns of ICU staff, expected to participate 384 in DCD, began to develop and become visible. These worries were largely orientated around the 385 practical tasks involved in DCD, and included: 1) Dealing with families: the contingencies of consent: These common-sense, situated concerns were, in turn, worked through by Emily, as part of her task 396 in training staff about the new procedure. This she did using a number of strategies, namely by: 397 reassuring her audience that the procedures they are learning are flexible: mouldable to donor 398 scenarios as they are encountered; allaying their concerns using her own experiential knowledge of 399 the process of DCD; reassuring them about certain practices that would absolutely not occur (such as 400 pressurising families into consenting); and orienting the nurses to practical solutions for potential 401 problems, such as how to conceal the dead status of a donor. In so doing, Emily translates the new 402 procedures around DCD into "locally relevant guides-to-action" (Kierans & Cooper, 2013: 226) : as 403 having the ability to work with, rather than against, the everyday contingencies and concerns involved 404 in clinical practice. The conceivable (ethical, practical, personal) concerns of staff, responsible for 405 putting DCD into action, were therefore made tenable by practically orientating them to future 406 solutions within the organisational setting in which these concerns were composed, and worked 407 through. 408
These intensive preparations for the DCD programme at Hillview were a way of ensuring that 409 everything was ready to actually do DCD, or, in John's words: "it was just a matter of going ahead and 410
making sure that what we'd done [to prepare] was sufficient to get us through the process [of DCD]". 411
However, towards the end of my fieldwork, it became apparent that preparations for the (ethical) 412 practicalities of DCD could never fully encompass the reality of what was involved when a potential 413 DCD donor came along. By the time the DCD programme had been up and running for a few months 414 at the end of my fieldwork, the hospital had gone through the process of having two potential DCD 415 donors. Neither of these had ended up proceeding to donation: one patient did not die in the allotted 416 two hour time-slot after care was withdrawn (this ~ time period between withdrawal of care and the 417 patient going into asystole is necessary if the organs are to be of suitable quality to donate); the other 418 case had not gone as planned and donation did not go ahead. Interestingly, these cases were not 419 something that Emily and John discussed in detail, due to potential sensitivities over the programme 420 having only just been implemented and their first potential DCD cases not having been successful. This 421 lack of transparency around the actual practice of DCD at Hillview is more telling than frustrating. It 422 reflects the 'silencing' of certain stories about organ donation (Jensen, 2011; Sharp, 2006) which have 423 the potential to "undermine" the "fragile system" of transplantation, reliant, as it is, on the public 424 willingness to donate (Jensen, 2017: 121-122) . In this case, these non-stories highlight the fact that 425 DCD is not only locally constructed as an ethical issue for patients, families, health professionals and 426 hospital Trusts. Ethics in DCD extends wider, into understandings around what kind of information 427 about the practice of DCD is deemed (ethically) acceptable for public consumption, in the context of 428 a perceived organ shortage and the reintroduction of DCD as a way of tackling the ever-growing 429 demand for organs. 430
Discussion and conclusion 431
The current focus by transplant policy-makers and bioethicists relate the ethics of DCD to sets of 432 abstract principles, which are understood as being relevant for the practice of DCD. For example, the 433 principle of 'overall benefit' is represented as the benchmark for practitioners, in their task of making 434 (ethical) decisions about intervening in the care of dying patients for the purposes of organ donation. 435
In other words the notion of what constitutes ethics in DCD and how DCD should be ethically practiced 436 has been drawn in stone by official discourse. 437 Whilst I am not disputing the importance of delineating what is, and is not, acceptable for clinical 438 practice in matters around end-of-life care and organ donation, the findings presented here show that 439 ethics in DCD are not abstracted moral issues, but present as emergent practical problems, which are 440 deeply embedded within specific organisational settings. In the context of Hillview, general concerns 441 around DCD -such as the legalities of withdrawing treatment and proceeding with organ donation -442 interacted with more concrete practicalities and fears in relation to historical practices and existing 443 institutional culture around organ donation at the Trust. Following Lynch (2013), the ethics of DCD are 444 therefore encountered and constructed as particular sets of problems which cannot be disentangled 445 from the institutional (historical, practical, and political) milieu in which they emerge. 446
Moreover, the data from this case was documented prior to the production of the Ethical Framework 447 for DCD (2011), and at a time when the legal parameters for the practice had only just been published 448 (DH, 2009 guidelines). As such, staff at Hillview could be considered 'moral pioneers' (Rapp, 2000: 449 307) , in that they first had to create the conditions to make DCD functionally possible at the Trust, as 450 well as define and work through conceivable predicaments of DCD as they were encountered. As we 451 saw in the case presented, concerns expressed around DCD were novel and often pragmatically 452 orientated around the steps that were necessary to convert a potential DCD donor into reality. Notions 453 of what were potentially at stake in DCD went far beyond the abstracted bioethical principles such as 454 'overall benefit', as laid out in the guidelines, and included understandings of: the potential for DCD 455 to reduce local transplant waiting lists; the reputation of the hospital Trust and their staff, alongside 456 public perceptions of organ donation; the welfare and actions of potential donor families; and changes 457 to the everyday work of health professionals caring for dying patients. In turn, the process of working-458 through these locally situated concerns around DCD involved animating procedures into acceptable 459 forms of practice for the everyday environments in which DCD would be realised and donor organs 460
